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Abstract 
This essay investigates thought as an event of “multiplicity.” French philosophers Gilles 
Deleuze and Alain Badiou pose this as a concept of change (political and otherwise). Both 
philosophers propose that multiplicity means thinking happens as an event by engaging a 
theoretical impasse, or “un-thought.” Un-thought opens up and changes ideas into complex 
varieties or multiplicities. This dynamic is examined through the example of May ’68, an 
actual event that gives context to how multiplicity expresses “radical change.” The aim of this 
article is to see how both thinkers’ theories overlap. For Badiou, multiplicities are “truths” 
that happen whilst making a decision, engaging a notion of “point.” For Deleuze, 
multiplicities are concepts that happen materially in life as metaphysical forces, or “lines.” 
Multiplicity is critically approached as a complex variety of ideas that change in the forms of 
art, politics, and science.  
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For there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity. (Deleuze, 2006c, 22) 
 
In this essay I will investigate how thinking is said to be a “multiplicity” that happens through 
an “event.” To understand how thinking is an event I will look at two philosophers: Alain 
Badiou and Gilles Deleuze. They are among the few philosophers today to develop 
multiplicity as a concept. My aim is to examine their claims around multiplicity, particularly 
one fundamental claim that this concept is about “change.” What changes and becomes a 
multiplicity are ways of living and being in complex wholes (situations, environments, 
worlds). And what also changes are the very limits or conditions that make new ideas 
possible. This view challenges how ideas are produced mentally and privately. According to 
Badiou and Deleuze, thoughts are “events” precisely because they disrupt introspection and 
happen “outside” the mind. To understand this key feature, I will open with a description of 
the event that took place in the May 1968 uprisings in France and beyond, from Italy to 
Mexico. I will use this example to show that multiplicity can be used to reorient thinking as 
something that takes place out in the so-called real world. There are two objectives that shape 
this investigation. The first is to see what thinking is in relation to life and notions of being. 
There is a multiplicity of thought, as I wish to call it, that make ideas possible, but from a 
theoretically interruptive standpoint: “un-thought.” This leads to the second objective: to 
investigate what “un-thought” means in terms of a theoretical impasse, that is, the interruption 
of the capacity to think, to live, to exist.  
 
 For both Badiou and Deleuze, the capacity to think is experienced through certain 
cognitive interruptions, resonant with blockage or impasse. The capacity to think any thought 
is possible only by working through, what I further wish to call, the multiplicity of un-thought. 
“Un-thought” means that thinking can only become an event, really take place, if it opens up 
into strands that go beyond pure philosophy. In the plainest sense of the word, multiplicity is 
how thoughts multiply into infinitely different complex strands. As I will show, such strands 
include science, politics, and art. 
 
 Let us start by asking some basic questions. How might thought take place as a 
multiplicity? And how would this be more than philosophical thought, the bastion concerned 
with only thinking itself? These can be understood as basic questions which can guide this 
inquiry into multiplicity as an event that, so to say, “takes place.” The “place” is theoretically 
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complex. It is the limit where thinking any particular thought (for example, a rose, loved one, 
artwork) confronts a certain theoretical impasse, or un-thought. This impasse might be 
interpreted crudely through common situations, as when someone experiences writer’s block; 
or when recalling a name seems too difficult. But un-thought is not just some mental blockage 
that eventually passes. The question of multiplicity deals with a theoretical place of 
obstruction, or “impasse.” For the moment let us say that un-thought is the theoretical place 
where any particular thought can become an event. It is where multiplicities can generate 
experiences and, at once, engage quite abstract theoretical spaces. These spaces are 
“structural.” To really understand how multiplicities take place as events, we need to inquire 
further into such structural spaces. Here we should keep in mind modern French philosophical 
discourse: what is often called “post-structuralism.” Badiou and Deleuze are very much 
integral to this discourse. Post-structuralism addresses thinking as a question of spaces and 
elements, signs and symbols, which can range from lines, to planes, and points as well. Just as 
one might view a city or territory from above, so it might be said that multiplicities take place 
topologically. As post-structuralists would say, thinking happens topologically, “inside” and 
“outside,” taking place in the mind and out in the world. 
 
 Multiplicity is something that actually takes place. It is not purely abstract theory. One 
might say that both Badiou and Deleuze use their philosophies to fundamentally question 
notions of being, existence, and life. What does it mean to live? I would argue that this is a 
basic question that they pose. This question points of course to how they lived and related to 
one another. Their relationship is rather complicated and goes back to their teaching days at 
Vincennes—known today as The University of Paris VIII. Vincennes was an institution born 
from an example of a real event: the political uprisings in France and the world beyond, from 
Prague to Mexico, that happened around May 1968. For Badiou this was a real event, 
“beyond all calculation” and imposing “a new situation of thought” (2013b, 106). May ’68 
was a time of unprecedented intellectual, cultural, political, and artistic engagement. For 
Badiou, especially, this event was—and still is—exemplary. May ‘68 was a real event 
because it arrived with utter surprise, incalculably, suddenly, and without prediction. 
Historians often claim that this event was mainly caused by the war in Vietnam; however, in 
retrospect, May ‘68 can fundamentally be seen as a struggle against “a sort of global 
stabilization and expansion of capital” (110). In France, and particularly Paris, the uprisings 
involved university students and union workers railing against conditions and effects that 
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would evolve into the current global market form of capitalism. This ideology would become 
dominant, making the world seem whole, interconnected, one totality—and as Badiou would 
say “One,” an all-encompassing multiplicity. Changing this ideology (global market 
capitalism) continues to be a defining struggle for philosophers like Badiou as well as many 
quite “left-wing” activists and movements.  
 
 So, what is the issue here? Why multiplicity? Well, the issue is really this: that the 
world today remains very much filtered through a world-view that makes life seem one 
multiplicity, full of all sorts of stimulating things and filled with possibilities of “change.” 
However, real or radical change seems impossible—“it has become easier to imagine the end 
of the world than the end of Capitalism” (Jameson 2003). “Change” is merely about a life 
focused on producing a variety of commodities, careers, lifestyles, and hedonistic 
experiences. “Live without ideas” is an imperative that sustains this ideology (Badiou 2018, 
84). I argue that multiplicity is important now because it is about creating new ideas and 
different ways to live. May ’68 however showed that any “authentic” event faces a very real 
impasse. A defining slogan that was popular in May ’68 was “Soyez realistes, demandes 
l’impossible!” This translates to saying that what was demanded was something impossible to 
think. Of course, what exactly was demanded was not “change”; instead, the event became 
criticized for fizzling out into “sexual liberation and a hedonistic entrepreneurship from 
below” (Ali 2008).  
 
 Known at Vincennes for his Maoist militancy, Badiou was often found waging 
“guerrilla warfare against Deleuze” (Dosse 2010, 366). He was known for crashing in on 
Deleuze’s seminars. Nevertheless, both men corresponded extensively. Although Deleuze 
disposed of his correspondences, Badiou used them to later write his book, Deleuze, The 
Clamor of Being (1997; 2000). Published two years after Deleuze’s tragic death, his book has 
sustained ongoing controversy. To date, the controversy largely polarizes both men through 
the following interpretation. Badiou fundamentally proposes multiplicity in two ways—or 
what he also calls a non-dualistic Two: a theoretical pure multiplicity in which thoughts take 
place theoretically (in terms of a mathematical science of being, or ontology) and a real 
multiplicity, in which thoughts are events that become “truths.” Deleuze says that a 
multiplicity is an act of thinking that is intensive and changes Life. For him Life (spelled with 
a capital “L”) is something vital, the sense that thought is alive, intense and happening. He 
Page 5 of 21 
 
calls Life “virtual”—and the virtual is not illusory, like virtual reality or digital simulations. 
The virtual is Life in the sense of forces like gravity or energy. What the current debates 
therefore pose—and we should be hesitant to maintain this—is an interpretation that divides 
Badiou and Deleuze. That is to say that Badiou is the thinker of event and being, a philosophy 
of the Two (pure multiplicities that structure real multiplicities); and Deleuze is the thinker of 
the event of being, in which being is a kind of creative event that happens in matter and 
throughout a variety of environments. Here I wish to propose a less divisive interpretation. My 
hypothesis is that both interpretations of multiplicity theoretically overlap. This overlap can 
be seen in terms of the theoretical space where un-thought is reticulated as an Outside. 
Outside deals with a sort of heterogeneous space that effectively opens any particular 
thought, truth or idea.  
 
 That the event happens Outside might seem obscure and emphatic. But this is largely 
because multiplicity is couched within a complex and heterogeneous space, where being 
never remains the same. The Outside is where multiplicity is something theoretically 
obstructive and, nevertheless, necessary to think through (Žižek 2014, 321). Metaphorically 
speaking, Outside is like a shell that has no inner object. The “obstruction” is in neither being 
able to intellectually grasp some “hidden object” nor being able to avoid thinking whatever 
might be happening around this shell. To think something completely new and different 
someone has to work through
1
 the obstructive sense of the multiplicity of un-thought.  
 
 To bring a more critical understanding to multiplicity in its thought-event, let us 
consider three topics: the topological elements of line and point, the individual as a kind of 
bodily subject, and traces that address the event. The “trace” and “body” regard a materialist 
approach to thinking in terms of line and point, movement and decision. 
 
Vitalist Multiplicity 
We should start then by briefly looking at multiplicity in terms of its emphasis on life. This 
deals with a certain “vitalist” multiplicity. As Deleuze says, with his occasional co-writer 
Félix Guattari, multiplicity is something that happens throughout life at its most essential, 
                                                 
1
 On working through as a Freudian psychoanalytic method, interpreted through Badiou’s 
philosophy, see Ruda 2015. 
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diverse, and complex. Like electrical forces that flow between neurons or blood pumping in 
one’s veins, this vital act makes one alive and able to think. Deleuze also articulates such 
forces by using the element of the “line.” The line is a—metaphysical—element that renders 
“mental objects determinable as real beings” (Deleuze and Guattari 2003, 207). The line 
expresses the act of thinking, language, and being. So, thinking has a radically empirical 
sense. The line is what Deleuze also calls “virtual.” The virtual is a vital act that resonates 
with creative force; but also with biological, psychophysical, and indeed metaphysical 
phenomena. Take his example of synaptic phenomena found in the brain. Synapses are said to 
spark signals between neurons that can fire throughout the entire body. These neuronal signals 
generate activities we cannot readily see. However, such “hidden” biological operations are 
too mechanistic; neurons would seem to fire signals and connect within a hidden network 
(underneath one’s skin), but this does not express the “mental chaosmos” in which the event 
of thinking virtually happens (208).  
 
 For Deleuze, Life is a matter of lines, forces that multiply into different multiplicities. 
The element of a point however remains problematic. Deleuze highlights this problem when 
he claims “a point traversing the line” is merely “the quasi-cause. . . the decentered point. . . 
the point of nonsense” (Deleuze 1990, 183). 
 
 The problem at hand is more complex. It deals with the rather emphatic notion of event 
as happening “Outside” in the vitalist sense. Here multiplicity structures an event that is 
“monomaniacal in operation,” as writer Jon Roffe comments, “a disparate and disjunct 
ensemble of operations that cannot communicate with one another through any ideal form of 
the object that they all share” (2012, 36). Indeed, an individual might remain “caught up in 
the great drama” of an “eccentric spiraling at the heart of being” (157). However, to prevent 
this “eccentric spiraling” becoming meaningless or totally obscure, mystical or nihilistic, we 
should ask plainly: what kind of multiplicity is really thinkable?  
 
 So far we can understand multiplicity in the following way: Multiplicity refers to how, 
universally and not just particularly, ALL things become what they are. One and many. 
Diverse and complex. Now we might wonder, why does it matter to know this? Well, one 
main reason is that multiplicity also changes the inherent way, the very means or capacity, 
that makes these complex varieties possible to think and experience. In practice, multiplicity 
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refers to how any of us not only think but also rethink any worldview as the only kind. In the 
case of May ‘68, multiplicity is the act of obstructing the capitalist worldview as the only kind 
of complex whole. 
 
Disjunctive Synthesis  
Let us look further at the vitalist form of multiplicity, where it is coming from and how it 
seems to work. It is French philosopher Henri Bergson who, at the turn of the
 
twentieth 
century, advances this notion by proposing that multiplicity is a “vital order” grounded in 
matter (1998, 236). Life and matter are “two movements” folding into “an undivided flux, and 
undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track” 
(Bergson 1998, 249). Surprisingly, the very stuff of life (being, what is) remains “cut out” 
from this flux. Vitalism emphasizes instead that thought “unfolds outward and externalizes 
itself” as it, simultaneously, “turns back within itself” (Bergson 1992, 124). Thinking unfolds, 
or one might say externalizes itself throughout this trace-like force. Externalization is the act 
of tracing life outwards and through an indeterminate force. This “abstract line must confront 
this indeterminate, this groundlessness” (Deleuze 1990, 275). And therein resides the 
undivided flux of “an event, a singularity, a life. . . ” (Deleuze 2005, 30).  
 
 In its vital order, multiplicity externalizes and inherently changes Being (spelled with a 
capital “B”). Being is Life “becoming” by unfolding itself into living matter—and this 
becoming is not to be conflated with some yin-yang-like harmonious flux, for instance. This 
complex topology presents thought as: 
Not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds 
and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than 
outside, but precisely the inside of the outside. . . . (Deleuze 2006a, 80) 
 
Matter is what lives by “folding” throughout “peristaltic movements” in order to 
virtually force thought Outside. This act opens “pre-conceptual components” (May 
2003, 141). Here it should be clarified that the virtual interrupts meditative approaches 
to thinking. Someone cannot just close their eyes, meditate, and think some kind of 
inner Being, spiritual object or proper substance (the real Me, proper I). Being is the 
event that is Outside because it happens without returning to any proper inside or 
internal object. Whatever mentally goes in irreversibly folds and goes out. Folds 
express “groundlessness”—and one could further say tracelessness.  
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 It is here that we can now see the most radical feature of multiplicity. Thinking folds 
virtually throughout “unthought,” that is, the “impossibility of thinking which doubles or 
hollows out the outside” (Deleuze 2006a, 80). Vital multiplicity is undoubtedly complex. This 
is mainly due to multiplicity’s “impossibility,” its inherent obstruction to any commonsense 
form of intellectual activity. When Deleuze writes that “every idea is a multiplicity or a 
variety,” he claims to reformulate the very nature of thinking, which has “neither sensible 
form nor conceptual signification” (1994, 183). This is not to say that thinking is completely 
impossible; multiplicity is “vital” because it requires intense engagement, everything in you 
and more. An authentic event is impossible to predict—like May ‘68. Vital multiplicity 
happens when thought suddenly and irreversibly interrupts itself. This entire event is 
described by Deleuze—and criticized by Badiou—as a “disjunctive synthesis”: the event of 
inventing concepts by interrupting thought so to change thinking in its very capacity, that is, 
its pre-conceptual sense. In other words, the “synthesis” means folding the capacity to think 
Outside. Thought/multiplicity becomes this inside-as-outside.  
 
 Disjunctive synthesis becomes clearer when looking at vital multiplicity in relation to 
time and aesthetic experience. The value of disjunctive synthesis is “to create novelty and 
difference” (May 2003, 140). Deleuze presents this, for example, using paintings by Francis 
Bacon or Paul Klee. The event is aesthetic in that the painterly marks, composing imagery 
and figures, present the thoughts of the artist. Visually the imprints are “lines,” elements that 
trace certain intellectual activities in matter as paint and color. Lines render visible and 
tangible indeterminate forces (such as gravity, pressure, concentration). The artist paints with 
emotional and intellectual effort. This event is “disjunctive” by creating a “crack of thought” 
(Crockett 2013, 176). Metaphysically, this event traces a kind of empty-time, so “to make us 
sense these insensible forces,” every perceivable figure in the painting turning into a bodily 
“zone of indiscernibility” (Deleuze 2007, 40-42).  
 
 Here I argue that the line is virtually traceless. The line is nothing to think in essence; it 
is traceless and lived. Though traceless, hollow, and without content, the line is “what forces 
us to think” (Deleuze 2008, 62). It is “multiplicity’s growth, the extension and unfolding of its 
lines, the production of something new” (Deleuze 1995, 146). Thinking is the event of being 
emotive and expressive, affective and virtual. Such a “thought event,” as Eric Alliez 
comments, is the experience of “thought proceeding by virtualization” (2005, 87). 
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 Virtualization therefore marks a highly important logic in Deleuze’s theory. It is a logic 
of difference, a logic through which thinking takes place virtually. Virtualization “erases 
being” (Hammar 2007, 60). It is virtual in how thoughts become perceptible and affective, 
like seeing colors and feeling tension. Clearly the virtual does not mean experiencing illusions 
or digitally fabricated environments (for example, virtual reality). In short, virtualization 
“makes fluid the instituted distinctions, augments the degrees of freedom, hollows out a 
moving void,” as Alliez elaborates (2005, 87, emphasis added). Virtualization is traceless 
because it is “the real minus existence” (May 2003, 148).  
 
 By now we see how the line is the modus operandi of vital multiplicity. The line gives 
multiplicity its radical empiricism—of experiencing what hollows out, forces, bifurcates, 
differentiates, and so on. The vitalist ideology, however, views everything in Life under the 
element of the line. Theorist Peter Hallward critically observes that the line is emblematic of 
“a pure [in other words] or absolute between,” a moving void that “can just as well be 
described as ‘between’ nothing at all” (2006, 154). Even though this line virtually moves, it 
also hollows itself out, only to disjunctively synthesize and therefore become one indifferent 
multiplicity—rather than radically change thinking into different paradigms. The 
contradiction, which Hallward shrewdly calls up, is that vital multiplicity never affirms the 
radical change it implies. Its logic of becoming remains traceless and also monotonous. 
Instead, vital multiplicity resonates with a kind of quasi-mystical or spiritual pseudo-event—
and I will come back to this. The line therefore is the element that exposes vital multiplicity in 
its enigmatic sense, something abstract and open to uncritical forms of thought. 
 
A Point Un-thought 
What I find questionable about vital multiplicity is the abstract line as a kind of “trace.” Does 
the line trace a real or authentic event? The vitalist event traces only lines that express 
thought, becoming, Life. However, the line negates a more elemental point. Recall how 
Deleuze comments that the point is a “quasi-cause” and “nonsense.” Here is a passage in 
which he elaborates this in terms of the virtual: 
Lines aren’t things running between two points; points are where several lines 
intersect. Lines never run uniformly, and points are nothing but inflections of lines. 
More generally, it’s not beginnings and ends that count, but middles. (Deleuze 
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1995, 161) 
 
Obviously, the point is a profoundly negated element. It serves only to supplement the 
inflection of lines expressing thoughts that take place in matter. In itself the point is utterly 
superfluous. A point un-thought, one might say. The voided-point-of-inflection thus “marks 
the proliferation of the line, or its sudden deviation, its acceleration, its slowdown, its furor or 
agony” (Deleuze and Guattari 2002, 297). 
 
 Why is the point always already negated, unthinkable? According to Jacques Derrida, a 
contemporary of Badiou and Deleuze, “the point, as a limit, does not exist in act, is not 
(present)” because the line “removes the limit of the point only by developing its potentiality” 
(1982, 52). The point is voided. The point does not exist because it does not affect, does not 
force anything to happen. The point is a far more passive element. The point deconstructs the 
line’s event.  
 
 One main consequence of Deleuze’s philosophy is its resonance with capitalism. That 
Deleuze is “the philosopher of Capitalism” (Žižek 2004, 180) comes down to the virtual event 
he dresses multiplicity in, where flows and movements express the New Spirit of Capitalism 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). This event is not merely economic but metaphysical. It is 
metaphysical and totalizing by “thinking thought (its act, its movement) on the basis of an 
ontological precomprehension of Being as One” (Badiou 2000, 19). The line expresses the 
“totalization of beings in a unified principle,” which invokes “the paradigm of metaphysical 
thought par excellence” (James 2012, 138). Socially and politically, the Deleuzian event is 
“monotonous,” meaning “everything happens, in as much as everything happens” (Badiou in 
Boundas and Olkowski 1993, 56).
2
 This monotony of the virtual, as I wish to call it, strikes 
directly at the Deleuzian event: “[it] is always what has just happened, what will happen, but 
never what is happening” (Badiou 2009a, 382). This monotony makes Deleuze a “romantic of 
the infinite,” wherein the virtual is an “all-encompassing, gigantic vortex” (Tarby in Badiou 
and Tarby 2015, 138). For all its sensation and intensity, the event of vital multiplicity 
“amounts to little more than utopian distraction” and is “essentially indifferent to the politics 
of this world” (Hallward 2006, 162). What is worse is that Deleuze’s concepts could also 
                                                 
2
 See also Badiou’s four criticisms of Deleuze in Badiou (2009a, 381-387). 
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inspire military strategies—as they already have with the Israeli Defence Force! “Inverse 
geometry” is a strategy inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s “war machine” theory. IDF 
soldiers blast lines into urban buildings, thus “hollowing out” architectural passages to more 
effectively attack and “creatively” traumatize enemies (and civilians, too).  
 
 A more critical interpretation of multiplicity is therefore imperative. Here multiplicity 
must be unpacked in its metaphysical context and language, too. This involves looking at a 
philosophical theory stretching back to around 500 BCE. For Badiou, vital multiplicity 
happens under one key maxim that is originally posed by the Pre-Socratic philosopher 
Parmenides: “[Being] is the same thing which occurs and is said” (Deleuze 1990, 180). Both 
Deleuze and Badiou seem polarized in their positions towards Parmenides’s maxim “thinking 
and being are the same” (in McKirahan Jr. 1994, 152). For Deleuze, being is what is 
perpetually said and expressed throughout an event that “never stops happening and never 
ceases to await us: a pure virtuality” (2006b, 120). Of course, what never stops happening are 
metaphysical forces, lines that affect and change life, but without really engaging the element 
of “point.”  
 
 Let us look then at how the notion of a point takes place. This requires looking closer at 
Badiou’s view of multiplicity as “truth,” which means returning to Parmenides’s maxim. It 
states that Being as such “must either fully be or not” (Parmenides in McKirahan Jr. 1994, 
153). Rather strikingly, Badiou argues that Being is not. Whatever exists or has being is 
“never the concentration of vital continuity or the immanent intensification of a becoming” 
(Badiou 2009a, 384). He tries to say that there is no multiplicity of virtual forces; nor is Life 
expressed through non-representational colors and emotions. Instead his ultimate proposition 
is this: multiplicity means thinking “the void, which is neither presented nor represented” 
(Badiou 2005a, 108). No doubt this proposition poses difficulties. But this is precisely how 
Being is a pure multiplicity. It is pure in theoretically structuring the thinking of Being at a 
mathematical level, specifically through set theory. Pure multiplicity is the notion of impasse 
or un-thought. The gist of Badiou’s event is that multiplicity happens from the standpoint of 
the thinker as subject—rather than vital forces multiplying in matter and Life; and it is up to 
the subject to engage, or as Ruda would say, “work through” not-being (pure multiplicity). 
Moreover, it is the subject that poses new ideas as “truths,” which take place through four 
conditions: politics, art, science, and love. These conditions are where true ideas can be made 
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thinkable and translated further as: egalitarian freedom, poetic declaration, mathematical 
singularity, and amorous relation.  
 
 The major task for Badiou is therefore in distinguishing a purely void multiple from an 
infinite multiplicity, that is, Being from Event. This distinction makes his philosophy radical 
in every sense of the word. For Badiou, we truly see ideas. We focus on truths that appear 
through the world and change how we exist and appear in it. This distinction is clear in how 
certain persons as “subjects”—rather than individuals—present or force certain truths to 
appear. For instance, when someone falls in love, the person loved appears to the beholder to 
stand out from everything around them. This event opens up a kind of new world. 
Multiplicities as truths are engaged through an event of “primitive affirmation,” which is 
“something that is really an opening” (Badiou 2013a, 3). Hence the distinction: there is a void 
multiple that is in itself open or “generic,” a purely mathematical form that opens up the 
event; and yet it is theoretically thinkable in the science of being (ontology, transfinite set 
theories). Truths are thinkable by means of a subject faithfully upholding the event. And this 
event is the “opening” of truly different and multiple ways of thinking and existing.  
 
 Truths mean tracing the opening of multiplicity. Multiplicity opens, however, in the 
“impasse of thought that is internal to thinking the totality of being, rather than a name for 
some failure of thought,” explains Sam Gillespie; in other words, the “internal” impasse 
means tracing how “the void is not a physically existing vacuum, of a lack, of an existential 
wound at the centre of experience” (2001, 65). Pure multiplicity is a theoretical impasse 
because “its limit must be void from the beginning” (Hallward 2003, 82). As I am saying, the 
impasse echoes the point. To engage this elemental point somebody—with unwavering 
conviction, or (objectless) faith—needs however to “be there.” To appear means to decide as 
to how someone exists. The subject really appears in the world by, furthermore, working 
through the point (of un-thought) as an element within decision-making. 
 
 Now, without any preceding knowledge—other than theoretical knowledge of how 
Being is mathematically presented (void-multiple, impasse, opening)—the subject must 
decide what will be true or not. The subject decides—and then traces out—this or that 
direction, distinguishing true from false. The subject makes the proverbial leap of faith but, to 
reiterate, without having some deeper object or metaphysical Being to access. Decision 
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therefore “must be thought as pure point”; but since “the void is the unpresentable point of 
being of any presentation,” the task is to engage a completely uncertain situation: “if the void 
is not, it is because one cannot think an empty place” (Badiou 2005a, 77, emphasis added). A 
decision is made where “a subject is nowhere given (to knowledge)” (Badiou 2009a, 278). 
Multiplicities therefore “can’t be thought by means of the forms of knowledge available to 
us” (Badiou in Tarby and Badiou 2015, 115). Regardless of not knowing what to decide—and 
this we might find astonishing—the subject “can force new bits of knowledge, without even 
verifying this knowledge” (Badiou 2005c, 49). This event means working through what seems 
“radically unknowable,” thereby engaging in a decision that confronts where “thought butts 
against its own limit” (Ling in Bartlett and Clemens 2010, 50-51). 
Point and Void-Multiple 
Up until now we have investigated multiplicity as a concept of change at the level of Being. 
Deleuze’s multiplicity is the sense that Being is the event of the virtual, where we not only 
think but, metaphysically speaking, live. However, we have found that there are problems 
with this theory of becoming. Life/Being does not change beyond one order of thought; 
instead, what we live through now is, to keep using the case of capitalism, the same event of 
multiplicity, for example, expansion, growth, production, consumption, and so on. The 
Deleuzian concept of change (vital multiplicity) then has to be reconsidered in light of this 
monotony of the virtual. The following section will give us the chance to see whether 
Badiou’s multiplicity fares any better.  
 
 First, we should unpack how Badiou theorizes pure multiplicity. Recall Badiou’s 
rebuttal to Parmenides’s maxim. The stuff making thought possible (metaphysics) is about 
“not being.” Badiou proposes that Being as such is split. He dubs this split the Two—“a 
disconnected connection, an irrational couple” (2005a, 208). Being is a “void-multiple,” a set-
theoretical matheme that, as impasse or un-thought, obstructs metaphysical activities but 
really opens up and enables infinite possibilities of thought. Being and event, pure 
multiplicity and infinite multiplicities (truths), form an “irrational couple.” Truths happen 
through “disconnected connections.” And a subject bears this split as somebody that works 
through the radically unknowable, and, in doing whatever it takes, makes truths appear 
concretely.  
 
 It is here that we need to grapple with some of Badiou’s mathematical terminology, 
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which he derives from the set theories posed by Georg Cantor and Paul Cohen. According to 
Badiou, the world is a “place” which designates all things within this world as whole. He calls 
this place the “count-for-one.” What counts are things someone might be able to identify (for 
example, that tree, this house), so long as it is possible that “there is” One, a totality of things 
(whole, world). So the world is more of a complex situation, in the sense that this whole 
makes everything, which is countable, structurally void. This void is less than nothing (Žižek 
2012, 59; Ruda 2015, 93). Clearly the “void” is without any mystical or metaphysical 
connotations. And Badiou makes this clear by calling it the “void-multiple.” Only in Cantor’s 
notion of the “void-set” can there be a way to demonstrate that this less-than-nothing void is a 
unique set. Put plainly, this is the only set that belongs to itself as a subset of its totality. We 
could say that no-thing belongs with no-thing. And the void-multiple is the multiple of 
multiples if, and only if, the subset of its elements is greater than the set as a whole. This is 
the most crucial part of Badiou’s theory. It clarifies why un-thought is a theoretical impasse. 
In laymen's terms, the part that is in the whole/world is the person as subject. The subject is 
fundamentally split, thinking and trying to live as the “no-count” within the count-for-one. 
The subject is therefore split because the inner and essential stuff (Being), making him what 
he essentially is, is “no-thing” (Hallward 2003, 100). In practice, this “no-thing” is precisely 
where someone becomes a “subject.” If someone is a subject, with a real sense of truth to live 
for, he/she must be open enough to think by deciding more than or in excess of what is 
thought wholly as “world.” The subject makes the event of opening a new multiplicity, idea 
or truth, which happens through a moment of decision, or as Badiou says, “point of excess.”
3
 
  
 From Aristotle onward, much of Western philosophy has trivialized the point, relegated 
to having “no conceivable type of being, neither separable nor inseparable” (Badiou 2005a, 
70). Badiou turns the Aristotelian relegation around completely. Instead, the point is the 
element that enables a kind of non-metaphysical shift from void (Being) to event (truth). The 
point’s excess is how multiplicity, as the capacity to think, is a “zero affected by the barring 
of sense” (Badiou 2005a, 69). No wonder the point has no emotionally charged or affective 
qualities, and is therefore anathema to Deleuze’s intensive, vital multiplicity. The point bars 
Being, vitiates sense, obstructs and leaves open thought from becoming anything 
                                                 
3
 See “Meditation Seven: The Point of Excess,” in Badiou 2005a, 81-92. 
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metaphysically deeper. In this way Badiou proposes how “the void is the unpresentable point 
of being” (2005a, 77).  
 
Bodily Subject and Traceless Trace 
To slowly bring this investigation to a close, let us analyze the two criteria that answer the 
question first raised at the outset of this essay—How is multiplicity really thinkable in its un-
thought? The first criterion is about how someone, as a subject, might “appear” when making 
a decision. The second criterion is about what “point” this subject engages to decide and trace 
new ideas or truths. I argue that in itself the point takes place through a traceless trace. Here 
we need to deal with thought as a multiplicity that is political in meaning. There is a political 
kind of thinking that is imperative to what is a “dialectical materialism” posed by Badiou. 
This “materialism” is the way in which someone exists as a subject. The subject exists 
dialectically, namely to decide and “think the structural law of the empty place as the punctual 
anchoring of the excess over the place” (Badiou 2009b, 261). The dialectical materialist 
approach to the event resonates with egalitarian and collective modes of militant intervention. 
Recall that an authentic event is a “break,” an intervention into a dominant order (like 
capitalism), so to open up and impose change. One example Badiou will use to describe this 
intervention is the Marxist proletariat. For Badiou, the proletariat is a subject who is 
exemplified by the infamous Roman gladiator/slave, Spartacus. In the eyes of the State, here 
being the Roman Republic, all individuals (citizens, residents) are identified under a single 
order (One multiplicity). The State accords with Badiou’s post-structural notion of One, the 
order that counts everyone under count-as-one. However, Spartacus and other enslaved 
gladiators are publicly visible but legally degraded to silenced nobodies, counted under no-
count. So, to interrupt this punitive relegation, Spartacus must “think” by decisively forcing, 
or “punctually anchoring,” the event by means of a declaration. In this case Spartacus declares 
“We slaves, we want to return home!” From this declaration other enslaved gladiators 
assemble. According to the State, their event qualifies as a revolt. Unrecognized by the State, 
“home” names nowhere. The prospect of radical change is ignored by the State. But for 
Badiou, the declaration is exemplary of a trace. Tracing thought in the unthinkable or 
incalculable decision that opens an event means naming, and declaring this name again and 
again. The trace is event-like, enabling such men—via the structural law (void-multiple, 
empty place)—to override the State’s dismissal. The trace is the declaration opening new 
truths that enact radical changes. As theorist Ian James explains, this event means that 
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“radical changes or decisive breaks in historical situations can and do happen but they cannot 
be prescribed or known in advance nor fully apprehended in an immediate present” (James 
2012, 144). 
 
 When radical change happens, the subject appears and in a bodily way. He physically 
appears as a “real, concrete creation,” which incorporates the trace in yielding “access” 
toward one’s “thinking of the infinite itself” (Badiou 2009c, 4). At the same time, there is a 
“problem of the body” which becomes a “matter of bringing the status of appearing to 
thought” (Badiou 2009a, 35-36). The “problem,” however, threatens to become aesthetic in a 
rather perplexing way. For it is curious as to how real multiplicities, or truths, are traced 
through bodily form. Badiou seems to suggest that the body is not the privileged site of the 
putative thinker—the cogito grounded through consciousness of, for example, metaphysical 
Nature, Divine Being or God. For “the subject is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness 
of the true” (Badiou 2005a, 397). Because the subject cannot “access” un-thought (other than 
already understand that any “ground” of Being or ontology is mathematically void, less than 
nothing) he must appear concretely and Outside. Real multiplicities, so to speak, mean 
thinking truths Outside. That is to say, without any special consciousness, without any 
mystical thinking or spiritually metaphysical foundation, decisions are made through an 
(objectless) act of faith.  
 
 The problem of the body extends further into aesthetics. Here I consider a criticism 
made by French theorist Jacques Rancière. The trace is a primary example of what he 
generally says about Badiou’s notion of truth: “it always lies within the difference between 
what comes to pass and that through which it passes,” wherein “the immanence of thought in 
the sensible immediately splits into two” (Rancière 2009, 66). The reader might notice the 
parallel this “split” has with vital multiplicity. Here it is helpful to unpack this parallel by 
going into another artistic example of the event. Take Badiou’s study of dance. For him, a 
dancer moves by tracing “a circle that is not drawn from outside, but rather draws itself” 
(Badiou 2005b, 58). Thinking happens in the “disjunctive energy” drawn throughout “the 
creative force of disappearance” (Badiou 2005b, 65). Badiou is quite ambiguous in this 
language. He employs forms of the virtual and the line, too. He attempts to articulate the line 
as the tracing of a “thought-body.” “Not as a thought caught in a body,” he says, “but as a 
body that thinks”; however, what I find expedient to this example—and here I agree with 
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Rancière—is the peculiar way the body seems to trace the “vertigo of the infinite” (Badiou 
2005b, 70). That is, the artistic event happens through a quasi-virtual multiplicity. What this 
means is that the virtual is a kind of itinerant staging of the event: thinking multiplicity as 
both passing away (traceless, disappearance) and passing onward (appearing, bodily). Here “a 
much more unsettling possibility of an event disavowing itself, erasing its traces,” can result 
in “a self-erasure of the event” (Žižek 2007, 6).
 
The dancer appears Outside in the sense that 
he cannot stop and think in advance of how to dance and trace this event. The dance would 
instead be done by “tracing” effects from decisions that have already happened, but where 
this subject cannot and does not need to think at all. Instead, the event is enacted faithfully 
again and again, the dancer appearing in bodily form by tracing movements that express 
perpetual disappearance. In this way it should be concluded that the event means engaging a 
trace that constantly risks total self-erasure. This trace is complicated by Badiou’s bodily 
subject, who moves virtually, as if disappearing and appearing at once by working through 
decisions and a point of un-thought. To this effect, an overlap becomes apparent in the 
impasse of un-thought that relates Badiou’s and Deleuze’s multiplicity.  
 
Real Events 
It is in light of this subject-oriented event that conclusions can be made. Essentially, I have 
tried to show that multiplicity is distinct from mystical, metaphysical or purely philosophical 
foundations. The theories posed by Deleuze and Badiou show that the capacity to think deals 
with a multiplicity that opens and changes the ontology of thought. In the purest sense, 
multiplicity is ontologically devoid of content. Un-thought is metaphysically de-ontological. 
Un-thought is, though intellectually obstructive (nothing to think or embody), necessary for 
opening the precondition for the possibility of creating infinitely more multiplicities, ideas, 
and truths. Indeed, such multiplicities are real events.  
 
 The multiplicity of (un-)thought addresses an “objectless philosophy” (Ruda 2015, 8). 
With Badiou particularly, what is certainly thinkable is the radical change insisted upon by 
the subject himself, who is constituted by the ontological split. That “split” is the incalculable 
space of the point as an Outside that someone makes a decision within. This act invokes a 
trace that symbolically renders the line representing any decision and way of existing 
traceless. And it is the subject that asserts new ideas by engaging this traceless trace into 
concrete forms; ideas are what appear through each of us driven enough to make them 
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happen. Ideas are exceptional multiplicities, new truths that are forced from “something 
inexistent” (Ruda 2015, 103). In which case Deleuze’s lines of thought have crossovers with 
Badiou’s event-like trace. Both theories overlap in the engagement with un-thought. What this 
means is that multiplicities trace new narratives and paradigms. Multiplicities do happen 
point-by-point, one step at a time—and, in difficult circumstances, such as May ’68, happen 
with two-steps back for every step taken.  
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